

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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ACDE-00 /026 W

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P R 291317Z JUL 76

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3167

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 6089

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENTS OF JULY 28, 1976

(SALT TWO - 1083)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 28, 1976.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 28, 1976

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL  
CONSIDERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE  
AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT--THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-  
TRANSFER ISSUES.

I

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT THE SOVIET UNION

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FIRMLY AND CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATES ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES

OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER.

THIS IS A MAJOR QUESTION TO WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLE.

ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985 IS TO ENSURE ITS VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS.

THIS ENSUES FROM THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, AS WELL AS FROM THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT IS TO BE A MAJOR STEP IN THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

ASSUMPTION OF A MUTUAL OBLIGATION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION IS ALSO AIMED AT ENHANCING ITS SIGNIFICANCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE.

TO BLOCK POSSIBLE WAYS OF CIRCUMVENTING THE NEW AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER, IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF QUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION HOLDS A CENTRAL PLACE IN THE SYSTEM OF NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT CONSISTENT EMBODIMENT OF THIS PRINCIPLE ACQUIRES SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH DIRECTLY PERTAINS TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LESSENING THE THREAT OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, HAS REPEATEDLY SPOKEN IN FAVOR OF ASSUMING OBLIGATIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

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THIS IS WHY THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES IT TO BE AN IMPERATIVE NECESSITY TO SET DOWN IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES IN CLEAR-CUT AND STRICT JURIDICAL FORM.

II

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS THE USSR DELEGA-

TION HAS REPEATEDLY, AT THE JUNE 16, 1976 MEETING AMONG OTHERS, PRESENTED THOROUGHLY WEIGHED EXTENSIVE RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AN OBLIGATION NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD AND THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE U.S. SIDE, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS THAT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD REFLECT THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PROVISIONS ON NON-TRANSFER APPLY TO THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COVERED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT.

TO JUDGE BY STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. SIDE, IN PRINCIPLE IT HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO ASSUMING NON-TRANSFER OBLIGATIONS.

RETENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY TO TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, OR TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, WOULD BY NO MEANS CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES. INDEED, TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES--FOR WHATEVER MOTIVES--WOULD STIMULATE A BUILDUP IN THE STRATEGIC POTENTIAL OF THESE STATES AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT UPON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. ALL THIS COULD LEAD TO DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES ON A SCALE DIFFICULT TO FORESEE AT PRESENT.

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IF, WHILE COMPLYING WITH THE NUMERICAL LIMITS ON THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES, ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, SUCH ARMS WERE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER STATES, THIS WOULD MEAN CIRCUMVENTION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND IN ESSENCE A DIRECT VIOLATION OF ITS SPIRIT AND LETTER. SUCH ACTIONS WOULD NULLIFY THE MEANING OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT; THIS IS NOT IN THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

THUS, THE NEED EFFECTIVELY TO RESOLVE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES DIRECTLY ENSUES FROM THE INTERESTS OF BOTH--I EMPHASIZE, BOTH--STATES, FROM THE TASK OF LIMITED STRATEGIC ARMS AND REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

MUTUAL NON-TRANSFER OBLIGATIONS WOULD ALSO BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE CONTENT OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

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THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF RECORDING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO POSTPONE WORKING OUT APPROPRIATE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY PROVISIONS ON THIS MAJOR ISSUE.

THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE RESOLVED ON A PARALLEL BASIS, AND THIS IS SHOWN BY ALL THE PAST WORK OF THE DELEGATIONS. AND THIS IS QUITE NATURAL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS WITHIN OUR TERMS OF REFERENCE. THEREFORE, AS FAR AS NON-CIRCUMVENTION

AND NON-TRANSFER ARE CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS WHATSOEVER TO ABANDON THIS PROVEN APPROACH.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AGREEMENT ON THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER PROVISIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONSTRUCTIVE STEP IN THE WORK OF THE DELEGATIONS.

III

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING OF ARTICLE IX, SUBPAR. (C), OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IN PARTICULAR, CONSIDERATIONS WERE EXPRESSED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE OBLIGATIONS NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS FOR INSTALLATION ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES, APPLY NOT ONLY TO THESE MISSILES BUT ALSO TO LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES. THIS WAS ALSO DEALT WITH IN THE SECRET

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U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE JULY 21, 1976 MEETING.

THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH ON BOTH SIDES IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT THE TEXT OF ARTICLE IX, SUBPAR. (C), HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

IN THE INTERESTS OF MOVING AHEAD IN THE WORK OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE USSR DELEGATION TABLES THE FOLLOWING REVISED WORDING FOR ARTICLE IX, SUBPAR. (C):

"ARTICLE IX, SUBPARAGRAPH (C)

(C) BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS FOR INSTALLATION ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES, OR LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES;"

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX, SUBPAR. (C), DO NOT AFFECT THE CURRENT PRACTICES FOR TRANSPORTING BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THUS, THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE SIDES ON THE QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO ARTICLE IX, SUBPAR. (C), PRACTICALLY COINCIDE.

IT IS ADVISABLE TO REFER THESE MATTERS TO THE DRAFTING

GROUP TO BE PUT INTO APPROPRIATE FORM.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO WISH THE U.S. DELEGATION  
A PLEASANT JOURNEY HOME. TILL WE MEET IN GENEVA IN THE FALL  
ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1976.

UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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